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In recent years, members of the United States Supreme Court
have included references to foreign law and international law in
several opinions interpreting the Federal Constitution. Some
members of the Court, political figures, and commentators view
this development as problematic.
One of the problems that critics have with this practice
pertains especially to comparative references to foreign law.
Critical observers maintain that there is no adequate principled
basis for distinguishing one country from another. They imply that
there is nothing to prevent a court from citing the laws of
repressive countries, as well as the laws from more freedom-loving
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countries, in this comparative endeavor. I label such critiques the
1
“jurisdictional selection objection.” With this objection in mind,
critics reject the comparative enterprise altogether. They would
generally prefer that courts stick to home-grown sources and
precedents when interpreting the Federal Constitution.
Recent comments by prominent legal and political actors
illustrate the jurisdictional selection objection. At a public speech
designed to support the Supreme Court candidacy of Harriet
Miers, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales complained about the
2
use of foreign law in U.S. constitutional interpretation.
He
maintained that “[i]f an American judge wants to find a law
3
consistent with his or her personal opinion, it can be found.” In
stating this complaint, General Gonzales referred to remarks made
by Chief Justice (then Judge) John Roberts during his confirmation
hearings for the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice compared the
use of foreign law in U.S. constitutional interpretation to “looking
4
over the crowd and picking out one’s friends.”
This Article focuses on one area of federal constitutional law
that had its share of controversy even before the question of
5
foreign and international analysis recently came to the fore: the
1. This phrase was coined by Professor Winer for the purpose of discussing
any argument criticizing the practice of referencing foreign legal sources in
constitutional interpretation on the asserted basis that it allows an unfettered
choice as to which jurisdiction’s authorities to select.
2. Mark Sherman, Attorney General: Justices Are Wrong to Cite International Law,
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1129626313552 (on file with author).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. There is a significant distinction between foreign law and international
law. For present purposes, the phrase “foreign law” refers to the law of any
national or sub-national legal system other than that of the United States.
Accordingly, a reference to French law or Chinese law, for example, would be a
reference to foreign law. On the other hand, for present purposes, “international
law” refers to the multilateral legal system that orders relations among states. The
primary elements of this legal system, more broadly called “public international
law,” are formal written treaties and customary rules of state behavior. Cf. JAMES R.
FOX, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 157, 211 (1997)
(definitional entries for international law and municipal law, respectively). The
distinction is important, because the system of public international law is quite
separate from individual systems of national domestic (often called municipal)
law. Commentators complaining about the current Supreme Court practices
discussed in this Article may be criticizing the Court’s references to either type of
source. This Article, however, will generally use the phrase foreign law, since the
jurisdictional selection objection pertains chiefly to the question of which
country’s law (which “foreign law”) should be consulted in any particular context.
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issue of how to identify fundamental rights under the substantive
components of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. I
suggest that the law of certain foreign jurisdictions, perhaps some
more than others, may be helpful in addressing the identification
of fundamental rights. Further investigation might show that
foreign states whose political and philosophical histories formed
part of the European Enlightenment are appropriate sources of
comparison.
If so, the history of a foreign jurisdiction’s
relationship to the European Enlightenment would provide a
principled basis for choosing which foreign law is appropriately
referenced when analyzing this feature of the U.S. Constitution.
I. RECENT USE OF FOREIGN LAW IN
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
One of the earliest references to foreign law in constitutional
interpretation, at least with the Court in more or less its present
configuration, occurred in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Printz v. United
6
States. In that 1997 case, the Court considered the constitutionality
7
of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. Specifically, the
Act required regulated firearms dealers in every state to forward
certain prescribed forms to their local chief law enforcement
8
officers, or “CLEOs.” The Act also required the CLEOs to make
“‘reasonable efforts’ . . . to determine whether the sales reflected in
9
the forms [were] lawful.” The Act authorized the CLEOs to grant
waivers of a federally prescribed five-day waiting period for
handgun purchases when they had “no reason to believe that the
10
purchases would be illegal.”
The Court, per Justice Scalia, viewed this situation as one in
which the state-government CLEOs were being “pressed into
11
federal service.” The Court struck down this aspect of the Act,
holding that “[t]he Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States’ officers, or their political subdivisions, to
6. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
7. Id. at 902; see Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000)).
8. Printz, 521 U.S. at 904.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 904-05. The preceding description of the pertinent Brady Act
provisions corresponds to 18 U.S.C. § 922(y)(3) and is discussed in the Court’s
opinion. Id.
11. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
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12

administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.” The Court
arrived at this result, in substantial part, out of concern for the
13
“‘inviolable sovereignty’” of the States and the necessity of the
14
“[p]reservation of the States as independent political entities.”
Justice Breyer, in his dissent (joined by Justice Stevens), took
issue with the majority’s assertion that allowing the federal
government to direct local law enforcement officers in this way
15
would compromise the independence of the States. Breyer seems
to be of the opinion that allowing the States themselves to enforce
the Brady Act provisions would respect state sovereignty more than
asking federal officers to perform the same tasks obtrusively within
16
the States. To bolster his assertion, Justice Breyer referred to the
structural regimes in Switzerland, Germany, and the European
17
Union. These “federal systems,” he maintained, “all provide that
constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves
implement many of the laws, rules, regulations or decrees enacted
18
by the central ‘federal’ body.”
Justice Breyer allowed that “[o]f course, we are interpreting
our own Constitution,” but he maintained that the experience of
these other governmental regimes might “cast an empirical light on
the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
19
problem.”
Reaction to this use of foreign law for comparative
constitutional interpretation was somewhat muted, perhaps
20
because the reference was merely in a two-Justice dissent.
This was not the situation, however, with the next major use of
foreign law for constitutional comparison by the Court. Five years
21
later, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court’s majority opinion, rather
than a mere dissent, referenced foreign legal sources. Even in
12. Id. at 935.
13. Id. at 918-19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
14. Id. at 919.
15. Id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 976-77 (“[A] system [of local enforcement] interferes less, not
more, with the independent authority of the ‘state,’ member nation, or other
subsidiary government, and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.”).
17. Id. at 976.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 977.
20. The majority opinion in Printz did acknowledge this aspect of Justice
Breyer’s dissent but only in a footnote. Id. at 921 n.11 (majority opinion) (“We
think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one.”).
21. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Atkins, which involved the constitutionality of the execution of
mentally retarded offenders, the majority’s reference was limited to
22
a footnote. Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, noted that
during the sixteen years leading up to the Atkins decision, eighteen
states and the federal government had passed statutes exempting
23
the mentally retarded from capital punishment.
She further
noted that “even in those States that allow the execution of
24
The
mentally retarded offenders, the practice is uncommon.”
majority concluded that the execution of the mentally retarded
“has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national
25
consensus has developed against it.”
In this context, the Court dropped a footnote intending to
26
buttress the idea that such a national consensus had developed.
The footnote referenced amicus briefs filed by the American
Psychological Association, the U.S. Catholic Conference, the
27
American Association on Mental Retardation, and others. In one
sentence out of the six composing the footnote, the Court quoted
an amicus brief submitted by the European Union and stated that
“within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty
for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
28
overwhelmingly disapproved.”
Despite the relatively minor character of this footnoted, singlesentence observation, the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) devoted the
majority of two paragraphs to refuting the references made to
29
other countries. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that he “fail[ed]
to see . . . how the views of other countries regarding the
punishment of their citizens provide[d] any support for the Court’s
30
ultimate determination.”
He added that “if it is evidence of a
national consensus for which we are looking, then the viewpoints of
31
other countries simply are not relevant.”
In the year following the Atkins opinion, references to foreign

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 316 n.21.
Id. at 313-15.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. n.21.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 325.
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law finally appeared in the full text of a majority opinion in
32
Lawrence v. Texas, although the references were somewhat
fleeting. Lawrence v. Texas is best known as the case in which the
33
Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, the 1986 Supreme Court case
that sustained a state statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy
against a due process challenge. The Lawrence Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Kennedy, emphasized that the Bowers Court had
relied in part on the point that “for centuries there have been
34
powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral.”
Justice Kennedy’s opinion noted that this “condemnation has been
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable
35
behavior, and respect for the traditional family.”
In overturning Bowers, the Lawrence Court declared that “our
laws and traditions in the past half century,” rather than those of
36
earlier eras, “are of most relevance here.” The Court observed
that these laws and traditions “show an emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how
37
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”
Furthermore, the majority insisted that the Bowers Court, seventeen
years earlier, should have acknowledged this “emerging
38
recognition.”
In support of this point, the Court cited several
legal developments that occurred prior to the Bowers decision,
including the release of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code in 1955 and patterns of non-enforcement of state criminal
39
sodomy statutes.
To further substantiate the prior existence of this “emerging
recognition,” the Court referenced two developments from foreign
jurisdictions.
The first was the 1957 Wolfenden Report,
40
The Report
commissioned to advise the British Parliament.
32. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
33. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
34. 539 U.S. at 571.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 571-72.
37. Id. at 572.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 572-73. The Model Penal Code “did not recommend or provide for
‘criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private.’” Id. at
572 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)).
40. Id. at 572-73 (citing The Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on
Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution (1963) (reprinting COMMITTEE ON
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, 1957 (London: HM Stationery Office,
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recommended the repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct,
41
and Parliament adopted this recommendation ten years later.
The second reference was to the 1981 decision of the European
42
Court of Human Rights in the case of Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.
The Lawrence Court noted that in Dudgeon, the European Court
determined that the laws of Northern Ireland forbidding
consensual homosexual conduct within the home violated the
43
European Convention on Human Rights.
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) criticized these references to
44
foreign law.
Justice Scalia complained that “[c]onstitutional
entitlements do not spring into existence . . . because foreign nations
45
decriminalize conduct.” He also criticized the Court’s discussion
46
of foreign views as meaningless, even dangerous, dictum.
Three days before issuing the Lawrence opinion, the Court
issued the much-awaited affirmative action opinions in Grutter v.
47
48
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. The Grutter decision contained a
foreign reference that was far less significant, as it came in a
concurring opinion, rather than in the majority opinion as in
49
Lawrence. Grutter involved the admissions policy at the University
of Michigan Law School, which aspired to “‘achieve that diversity
50
which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education,’” and
which reflected the law school’s “longstanding commitment” to
51
“‘racial and ethnic diversity.’”
In an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the Court held that
the law school had a compelling interest in attaining a diverse
52
student body and that the law school’s admissions policy bore the

1957) and the British Sexual Offenses Act, 1967, § 1 (Eng.))).
41. Id. at 572-73.
42. Id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52
(1981)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id. Justice Scalia identified this dictum as “dangerous” because “‘this
Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’” Id.
(quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
47. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
48. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
49. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 315 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 328.
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53

hallmarks of a plan narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
54
The Court thus concluded that the Equal Protection Clause did
not prohibit the law school’s use of race in admissions pursuant to
55
its policy. Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor’s opinion warned in its
closing paragraphs that “race-conscious admissions policies must be
56
limited in time.” Accordingly, the Court majority delineated its
expectation that “[twenty-five] years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
57
approved today.”
Justice Ginsburg, in a four-paragraph concurring opinion
58
joined by Justice Breyer, focused mainly on indications that racial
minority students still suffer substantial disadvantages in
59
educational opportunities. In the first of those four paragraphs,
however, she noted that the twenty-five-year end point specified in
the majority opinion “accords with the international understanding
60
of the office of affirmative action.”
In so doing, she cited
61
the
provisions of two international multilateral treaties:
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
62
Discrimination, which the United States has signed and ratified,
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
63
Discrimination against Women, which the United States has
signed but not ratified. Justice Ginsburg cited provisions in each of
these anti-discrimination treaties that support the idea that
affirmative action measures should be short-lived and

53. Id. at 334.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
56. Id. at 342. A durational limitation reflects the danger of racial
classifications, which must be employed no more broadly than the compelling
interest demands. Id.
57. Id. at 343.
58. Id. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
59. Id. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that in the 2000-2001 school year, 71.6%
of African-American children and 76.3% of Hispanic children in the public school
system attended schools in which minorities made up a majority of the student
body. Id. at 345. The educational resources available to schools in predominantly
minority communities lag far behind those available to other public schools. Id.
60. Id. at 344.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M.
352).
63. Id. (citing Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33).
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64

impermanent.
65
In the 2005 case of Roper v. Simmons, the Court included the
most extensive discussion of foreign sources that has yet appeared
in a majority opinion for the purposes of constitutional
66
interpretation. In Roper, the Court held that “[t]he Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on
offenders who were under the age of [eighteen] when their crimes
67
were committed.” In the main body of the opinion, the Court
wrote that the death penalty, because it is the most severe
punishment, must be reserved for a narrow category of crimes and
68
offenders.
The Court then determined that juveniles have
diminished culpability for their crimes because of their relative lack
of maturity, undeveloped sense of responsibility, vulnerability to
negative influences and outside pressures, and incompletely
69
formed character. Furthermore, the Court determined that the
penological justifications of retribution and deterrence applied to
70
juveniles with lesser force than to adults. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment

64. Id. (“[S]pecial and concrete measures to ensure the adequate
development and protection of certain racial groups . . . shall in no case entail . . .
unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which
they were taken have been achieved.” (quoting International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 2(2), opened for signature
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218, 5 I.L.M. 352, 355)); id. (“[T]emporary special
measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not
be considered discrimination, [but] shall be discontinued when the objectives of
equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.” (quoting Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 4(1), Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 16, 19 I.L.M. 33, 37)).
65. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
66. Professor Alford has recently published an essay focused specifically on the use
of foreign sources in Roper. His somewhat ironic discussion of what he terms
“international equipoise” sounds to a substantial degree in the jurisdictional selection
objection. He suggests, however, that the full range of constitutional rights should be
subject to comparative analysis. Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our
Constitution in International Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21-27 (2005); see also
references to other critiques by Professor Alford infra text accompanying notes 135-148.
Additionally, Professor Ernest Young has recently addressed the problem of foreign law
in Roper, although in ways that do not necessarily affect what is said in this Article. See
Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148
(2005).
67. 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
68. Id. at 1194-95.
69. Id. at 1195.
70. Id. at 1196.
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71

for offenders under eighteen.
Having reached this conclusion, however, the Court went on
to survey certain authorities culled from foreign and international
72
law.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began this
discussion by asserting that “the United States is the only country in
the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
73
death penalty.” While acknowledging that “[t]his reality does not
74
become controlling,” the Court was plainly moved by it. The
Court then referred to four international conventions that prohibit
or sharply disfavor execution of juveniles, including the United
75
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The Court next noted that “only seven countries other than
the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990,” but
that since then, each of the other countries “has either abolished
capital punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the
76
practice.” The Court next put special emphasis on the experience
of the United Kingdom regarding this subject “in light of the
historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth
77
Amendment’s own origins” in the 1689 English Declaration of
78
The Court determined that although the United
Rights.
Kingdom has abolished the death penalty completely, “decades
before it took this step, it recognized the disproportionate nature
79
of the juvenile death penalty.” Finally, the Court concluded that
“[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for

71. Id. at 1198.
72. Id. at 1198-1200.
73. Id. at 1198.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1199. The Court noted that the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child has been ratified “by every country in the world . . . save the
United States and Somalia.” Id. (citing United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1990)). The other
three conventions cited by the Court were the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, the American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 146, 9 I.L.M. 763, and
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 125 S. Ct. at 1199.
76. 125 S. Ct. at 1199. The seven other countries listed by the Court are Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
China. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 10 (1770)).
79. Id.
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80

our own conclusions.”
The majority opinion of the Court in Roper is not the only
portion of the decision that notably addresses the use of foreign
law in analyzing the U.S. Constitution. The two dissenting opinions
in Roper criticize the majority’s use of foreign sources. However,
81
82
the dissenting opinions by Justices O’Connor and Scalia are
miles apart in terms of tone and perspective.
Justice O’Connor begins by clarifying that she “agree[s] with
much of the Court’s description of the general principles that
83
guide our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.” In the bulk of her
opinion’s eleven pages, however, she maintains that no national
consensus within the United States has emerged against the capital
84
punishment of seventeen-year-old offenders. Only two of these
eleven pages are devoted to the Court’s treatment of foreign or
85
international sources, and the Court gets off fairly lightly at Justice
O’Connor’s hands. Although she concedes that “there has been a
global trend in recent years towards abolishing capital punishment
for under-[eighteen] offenders,” her view that there is no
widespread agreement within the United States prevents her from
86
assigning a “confirmatory role” to that international consensus. She
nevertheless explicitly insists that she “disagree[s] with Justice
Scalia’s contention that foreign and international law have no place
87
in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”
Justice O’Connor
softens her criticism of the majority’s approach by acknowledging
that “the existence of an international consensus of this nature can
serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine
88
American consensus.”
However, since she finds no American
consensus, this particular opinion does not seem an appropriate
one for the confirmatory role of foreign or international sources.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, sees no need to embark on
such a softened approach. Approximately five of the fourteen
80. Id. at 1200.
81. Id. at 1206-17 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1217-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1206 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
84. E.g., id. (“Although the Court finds support for its decision in the fact that
a majority of the States now disallow capital punishment of [seventeen]-year-old
offenders, it refrains from asserting that its holding is compelled by a genuine
national consensus.”).
85. Id. at 1215-16.
86. Id. at 1215.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 1216.
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pages of his dissent are devoted to his criticism of the majority’s use
89
Most of these pages are
of foreign and international sources.
devoted to a frontal attack on the use of foreign and international
sources in constitutional interpretation generally, quite divorced
90
from the context of juvenile execution. Justice Scalia asserts that
a significant number of foreign nations do not employ an
91
evidentiary exclusionary rule as does the United States, do not
“insist on the degree of separation between church and state that
92
this Court requires,” and are less apt to allow for “abortion on
93
These observations are
demand” than the United States.
illustrations of the jurisdictional selection objection, because his
point suggests that if the Justices in the majority chose the law of
different foreign jurisdictions in different contexts, they would get
results that were less popular or less palatable to those Justices. By
emphasizing these differences between foreign and U.S. law, Justice
Scalia seems to suggest that a weakness of a foreign-source
approach is the fortuity of which foreign countries’ laws are chosen
for reference. His criticism is, to that extent, based on the
jurisdictional selection objection.

II.

EXTERNAL COMMENTARY ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS BY MEMBERS OF THE COURT

Among the most prominent external commentators on the
Court’s use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation are
members of the Court themselves.
At the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (ASIL), Justice Stephen Breyer declared that
“foreign experience is often important” to the work of the Supreme
94
Court. In his presentation, he outlined five kinds of experiences
95
out of which his perception of the usefulness of foreign law arises.
Specifically, he noted: (1) many domestic legal questions directly
implicate foreign or international law; (2) for an increasing
89. Id. at 1225-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. See id.
91. Id. at 1226-27 (referring to United States evidentiary rules forbidding the
use of evidence obtained by illegal means).
92. Id. at 1227.
93. Id.
94. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 265
(2003).
95. Id. at 265-67.
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number of issues, including constitutional issues, the decisions of
foreign courts offer helpful points of comparison; (3) foreign
jurisdictions offer helpful materials apart from formal court
decisions, such as Council of Europe guidelines on the application
of precedents from the European Court; (4) foreign judges offer
valuable perspectives on institutional matters, such as overcrowded
dockets and mediation programs; and (5) traditional public
international law issues arise in the course of the Court’s daily
96
work.
These comments illustrate Justice Breyer’s support for
using foreign sources to interpret the U.S. Constitution.
Two years later, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed her
support of using international sources in constitutional
97
interpretation in her address before the ASIL Annual Meeting. As
an initial matter, Justice Ginsburg noted a symmetry in comparative
constitutional discourse: “[i]f U.S. experience and decisions can be
instructive to systems that have more recently instituted or
invigorated judicial review for constitutionality, so we can learn
from others now engaged in measuring ordinary laws and executive
98
actions against charters securing basic rights.” In this vein, she
declared that the U.S. judicial system “will be the poorer . . . if we
do not both share our experience with, and learn from, legal
systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar to our
99
own.”
Justice Ginsburg reviewed aspects of U.S. constitutional
history, and she suggested that foreign and international law played
a significant role in the founding of the republic and the text of the
100
Constitution.
She referenced the passages of the Declaration of
Independence according “a decent Respect to the Opinions of
Mankind” and soliciting the scrutiny of “a candid world” for the
101
actions of the fledgling state.
She also emphasized that the
Constitution granted Congress the power to “define and punish . . .
102
Offenses against the Law of Nations,” and that the framers
considered that “the new nation would be bound by ‘the law of
96. Id.
97. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Keynote Address: The Value of a Comparative Perspective
in Constitutional Adjudication, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. (forthcoming 2005),
available at http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.html.
98. Id. para. 2.
99. Id. para. 3.
100. Id. para. 6-11.
101. Id. para. 8.
102. Id. para. 11 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10).
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103

Nations’ . . . .”
She drew attention to the famous Charming Betsy
canon, first declared by Chief Justice John Marshall, to the effect
that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
104
law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”
Conversely, Justice Antonin Scalia articulated his opposition to
the use of foreign sources in constitutional interpretation in his
105
keynote address at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the ASIL. Justice
Scalia stated that in his view “modern foreign legal materials can
never be relevant to an interpretation of—to the meaning of—the
106
U.S. Constitution.”
He further offered three reasons why he
expected the Court’s use of foreign law in constitutional
107
interpretation to accelerate. First, he maintained that the “‘living
Constitution’ paradigm . . . prevails on the Court” and suggested
that those who espoused this view, “living constitutionalists,” are
108
illegitimately writing new constitutional provisions.
If one is
frankly involved in the process of writing a new constitution, he
complained, “there is no reason foreign materials should not be
109
used along with all others.”
Second, he asserted that the modern Court will continue to
use foreign law to support its “living-constitution decisions” because
it supplies “something concrete to rely upon,” maintaining that
110
“logical analysis” would not be a concrete basis for such reliance.
Finally, he argued that Court majorities would find it attractive to
use foreign law because “it vastly increases the scope of their
111
discretion.”
Probably the most detailed published discussion by any
Supreme Court Justice regarding the use of foreign sources to
interpret U.S. constitutional law is actually the transcript of a
112
This debate took
debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer.
103. Id. para. 11.
104. Id. para. 12 (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118
(1804)).
105. Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts,
98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 (2004).
106. Id. at 307.
107. Id. at 308-09.
108. Id. at 308.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 308-09.
111. Id.
112. See Justice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen Breyer, U.S. Association of
Constitutional Law Discussion: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court
Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/
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place on January 13, 2005 at the American University Washington
College of Law and was presented by the U.S. Association of
113
Constitutional Law.
The discussion, moderated by Professor
114
Norman Dorsen of the New York University Law School, is
notable for its depth and the extent to which it allowed each Justice
to fully state his position on this issue.
In the debate, Justice Scalia provided several arguments
against the use of foreign sources, though many of his arguments
115
were variations on the jurisdictional selection objection.
Three
examples suffice. Early in the discussion, Scalia complained that
the majority decision in Lawrence cited “foreign law—not all foreign
law, just the foreign law of countries that agreed with the
disposition of the case. But we said not a whisper about foreign law
116
He then asked, “[W]hat is the
in the series of abortion cases.”
criterion for citing [foreign law]? That it agrees with you? I don’t
117
know any other criterion to bring forward.”
In these comments,
he maintained that the Court used those rulings of foreign law with
which its members agreed, rather than embarking on a principled
examination of all foreign law or at least without a principled basis
for choosing which foreign law to reference and which law to de118
emphasize or ignore.
He emphasized the same point later with particular reference

050113.cfm (follow “Press release and full transcript” hyperlink).
113. Id.
114. Professor Dorsen is also the founding president of the U.S. Association of
Constitutional Law.
115. During this January 2005 discussion, Justice Scalia voiced two other
arguments against the use of foreign sources in this context that were not variants
of the jurisdictional selection objection. The first was that “one of the difficulties
of using foreign law is that you don’t understand what the surrounding
jurisprudence is.” Scalia & Breyer, supra note 112. That is, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to accurately understand foreign laws unless one is operating within
the same legal culture from which it emanates, and most U.S. judges and justices
are not. Accordingly, the use of foreign law by U.S. judges and justices may often
be a misapplication of foreign law. Second, Justice Scalia insists that the U.S.
Constitution, to the limited extent it should reflect the current views of any
population, should “keep up to date with the views of the American people,” as
opposed to the views of foreign populations or authorities. Id. This point might
simply be paraphrased as the assertion that the U.S. Constitution is meant to
govern and apply to a distinctly American political and legal culture, and
therefore, foreign influences in interpreting it are inappropriate simply by virtue
of their not being American.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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to European law. He allowed that:
[I]t was true that throughout all of Europe, it was
unlawful to prohibit homosexual sodomy. The [C]ourt
did not cite the rest of the world. It was easy to find out
what the rest of the world thought about it. I cited in my
119
dissent the rest of the world was equally divided.
This comment is based on the jurisdictional selection objection:
Justice Scalia maintained in effect that there is no principled way to
consider favorable European legal sources without giving equal
consideration to other legal sources from other countries.
The other participants in the debate also acknowledged the
jurisdictional selection objection. At one point Justice Breyer
himself conceded that in one of his opinions he may have made a
“tactical error in citing a case from Zimbabwe—not the human
120
This concession sounded in the
rights capital of the world.”
jurisdictional selection objection, because he acknowledged that
the choice of which foreign country’s law to reference can have
serious implications for the quality of one’s argument, and he
seemed to concede that the choice of country is a matter essentially
of discretion.
Indeed, even the moderator, Professor Dorsen asked a question of
Justice Breyer that presented the jurisdictional selection objection. He
stated: “I’m not sure I see many citations to East Asian courts, to South
American courts, to Islamic courts. And is it a fair criticism that there’s
a certain selectivity that is substantively or result-oriented in the ways
foreign references are considered by you and those who agree with
121
you?”
Thus, throughout this debate, which is one of the most
thorough published discussions by Supreme Court Justices on this
subject, one of the primary arguments stated in apprehension of
the use of foreign law is the jurisdictional selection objection.
III. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AS VIEWED BY
OTHER COMMENTATORS
Academic commentators, like members of the Supreme Court,
have varying views of the suitability of foreign law for interpreting
the Constitution. Among the most influential is Harold Hongju
Koh, currently the Dean of Yale Law School and a former President
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the ASIL. The American Journal of International Law (AJIL)
prominently stated some of his views in a 2004 symposium, which
also contained other essays discussed in the following paragraphs of
122
this Article.
Professor Koh’s symposium article emphasized the historical
pedigree of foreign and international law in early opinions of the
123
U.S. Supreme Court.
He referenced the Charming Betsy canon
124
discussed above and attached importance to John Marshall’s
statement in McCulloch v. Maryland that the supremacy of the
federal union within the scope of its powers would be a
“proposition [that] could command the universal assent of
125
mankind.”
He maintained that Marshall’s early opinions
“expressly promoted the implicit or explicit internalization of
126
and that “at the
international law into U.S. domestic law”
beginning of the republic, U.S. courts drew no sharp line between
127
international and foreign law.”
In Professor Koh’s view, the Court has used foreign and
international precedents to interpret the Constitution in three
contexts: (1) when “parallel rules” are involved; that is, when U.S.
128
legal rules seem parallel to those of other countries; (2) when
“empirical light” seems to exist; that is, when the experiences of
other countries cast empirical light on the consequences of
129
different solutions to common legal problems; and (3) when
“community standards” are material to adjudication; that is, when
certain constitutional restrictions, such as “cruel and unusual” and
“due process of law,” are interpreted in the context of community
130
values.
Other academic commentators have supported such
references to foreign and international law. In an article appearing
122. Harold Hongju Koh, International: Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L
L. 43 (2004).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 44; see supra text accompanying note 104 (describing Justice
Ginsburg’s later reference to the Charming Betsy canon in her 2005 address to the
American Society of International Law).
125. Koh, supra note 122, at 45 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
405-07 (1918)).
126. Id. at 44.
127. Id. at 45.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 46.
130. Id. at 45-46 (quoting Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
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131

in the same AJIL symposium described above, Professor Gerald
Neuman used historical Supreme Court opinions and
constitutional provisions to defend the nexus between U.S.
constitutional interpretation, on the one hand, and international
132
and foreign law, on the other.
Other commentators reporting
133
favorably on the practice include Professors Sanford Levinson
134
and David Law.
Academic perspectives are not unanimous in favor of foreign
and international references, to say the least. Among the most
135
active challengers is Professor Roger Alford.
In his contribution
136
to the 2004 AJIL symposium, Professor Alford warned that the
use of international precedents “could have the unintended
consequence of undermining rather than promoting numerous
137
constitutional guaranties.”
Initially, he argued that using
138
international sources could be “countermajoritarian” and could
dangerously elevate international sources over constitutional
restraints, thereby defeating the asserted supremacy of the
139
Constitution over international law.
The main thrust of Professor Alford’s critique, however, seems
131. Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (2004).
132. Id. at 82-84. Professor Neuman stated that “[i]n the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, after the Civil War had vindicated the Union’s claim to
nationhood, the Supreme Court repeatedly invoked international law doctrines
and writers in support of its elaboration of powers inherent in national
sovereignty.” Id. at 82-83. Neuman also described Supreme Court references to
foreign and international law in construing the Treaty Clause (U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2), the Thirteenth Amendment, the Eighteenth Amendment, and other
constitutional provisions. Id. at 82-84.
133. Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution:
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 355 (2004) (“[T]here ought to be no
country, most certainly including our own, that should regard its own instantiated
commitment to social justice or human rights as absolutely pristine, in need of no
wisdom that might be provided by external sources.”).
134. David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 659 (2005)
(“To expound a constitution—any constitution—is to draw upon and contribute
to a body of principle, practice, and precedent that transcends jurisdictional
boundaries. Commonalities emerge across jurisdictions because constitutional law
develops within a web of reciprocal influences . . . .”).
135. Roger P. Alford is an Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University
School of Law. Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the
Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 69 n.a1 (2004).
136. Id. at 57.
137. Id. at 58.
138. Id. at 58-61.
139. Id. at 61-64.
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to be that the use of international sources tends to be
140
“haphazard,” because practitioners of this method are “relying
141
only on those materials that are readily at [their] fingertips” and
142
“selective,” in the sense that “international sources are proposed
143
for comparison only if they are viewed as rights enhancing.”
These last two arguments, particularly the second, are variants
of the jurisdictional selection objection.
As explained, the
jurisdictional selection objection is the argument that there is no
principled way to decide which countries from which to draw
144
precedent.
It asserts that a comparative analysis could just as
easily draw on legal precedents from comparatively oppressive as
145
well as comparatively progressive regimes. Accordingly, if analysts
using comparative methods subjectively choose only precedents
from rights-enhancing jurisdictions, they are simply advancing their
146
own policy preferences without a principled basis for doing so.
In a later article, Professor Alford examined the use of foreign
and international sources under four constitutional theories:
147
originalism, natural rights, majoritarianism, and pragmatism. He
suggested that “the use of contemporary foreign and international
laws and practices to interpret constitutional guarantees is ill-suited
148
under most modern constitutional theories.”
Implicit in his
suggestion was a criticism of a perceived lack of coherence for
comparative constitutional interpretation that is also consistent
with his earlier criticism sounding in the jurisdictional selection
objection.
149
In another article included in the 2004 AJIL symposium,
Professor Michael Ramsey demurred on the ultimate question of
whether reference to foreign sources was desirable in interpreting
140. Id. at 64-67.
141. Id. at 64.
142. Id. at 67-69.
143. Id. at 67.
144. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
145. Id.
146. In advancing his “selective use” argument, Professor Alford seems to focus
on the policy-based selection of particular precedents, perhaps within particular
foreign jurisdictions, rather than policy-based selection of the jurisdictions
themselves. Alford, supra note 135, at 67-69. But his policy-based argument fairly
implies the jurisdiction-based objection as well.
147. Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52
UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005).
148. Id. at 712.
149. Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on
Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (2004).
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150

the U.S. Constitution.
Instead, he asked: “[I]f we are to
undertake a serious project of using international materials in this
151
way, what would that project look like?”
He arrived at four
“guidelines” for developing a “principled approach:” (1) there
must be a neutral theory as to which international materials are
relevant and how they should be used; (2) analysts and
commentators must be willing to “take the bitter with the sweet;”
using international materials to constrict as well as expand rights;
(3) there must be rigorous empirical inquiry about international
practices; and (4) hasty shortcuts to world consensus must be
152
avoided.
The first of these guidelines, as described by Professor Ramsey,
is in part a statement of the jurisdictional selection objection. He
even described a portion of his argument on this point in terms of
jurisdictional selection. He noted that Mary Robinson, a former
U.N. Commissioner of Human Rights, submitted a brief to the U.S.
153
154
Supreme Court for its consideration in Lawrence v. Texas.
He
noted that at one point the Robinson brief explained that in
various foreign jurisdictions sodomy was no longer a criminal
155
offense.
Ramsey then maintained, however, that “[w]ithout a
theory as to why (for example) Israel’s practice matters and India’s
does not, the brief’s citation of Israel and not India cannot be
156
justified.”
This illustrates a clear statement of the jurisdictional
selection objection as previously defined.
IV. THE JURISDICTIONAL SELECTION OBJECTION CONSIDERED
I offer two primary responses to the jurisdictional selection
objection. The first responds to a general complaint to the use of
foreign or international sources that is non-substantive and is easily
157
dismissed. The other is that the objection does state a legitimate
158
concern.
150. Id. at 69.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 69-70.
153. Id. at 70.
154. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
155. Ramsey, supra note 149, at 72 (discussing Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003
WL 164151).
156. Id. at 73.
157. See infra Part IV.A.
158. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. Dismissing an Initial Objection
One complaint intended to bolster the jurisdictional selection
objection is non-substantive and should be dismissed immediately.
The complaint is that merely because the use of foreign law
presents the judge or justice with a choice of which jurisdiction to
consult, it is somehow illegitimate to consult foreign law in general.
This was the objection voiced by Chief Justice Roberts during his
159
Senate confirmation hearings for Chief Justice.
Although this
objection has surface appeal to some, it is inadequate.
Judges and justices must frequently choose among different
legal sources to reference.
State court judges and justices
frequently cite the courts of other states, not for binding precedent
160
but for persuasive authority. Federal courts may cite decisions of
other federal courts (or even state courts) outside their geographic
circuits, again not for binding precedent but for persuasive impact.
Both federal and state court judges and justices may cite other
types of sources, such as treatises on economics, history, or political
161
In each
science, even though they have no binding legal effect.
such instance, the judge or justice chooses among a virtually
limitless selection of sources, precisely on the basis of which sources
are most persuasive. The mere fact that the judge or justice makes
a selection is not any more suspect when the selection is among
foreign sources than when it is among domestic ones.
It may be that in these circumstances a better judicial opinion
will also acknowledge any opposing authority from state court,
159. See supra text accompanying note 4 (describing Chief Justice Roberts’s
reported assertion comparing the use of foreign law in U.S. constitutional
interpretation to “looking over the crowd and picking one’s friends”).
160. This point was made, for example, by moderator Norman Dorsen during
the debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer referred to earlier. Scalia & Breyer,
supra note 112 (suggesting that a U.S. court can look at the opinions of a foreign
court for the persuasiveness of its opinions, “just as a New York court might look at
a Montana decision and be influenced not by the result . . . but by the cogency of
the arguments”).
161. The frequency with which U.S. federal courts cite authorities in the field
of economics when deciding anti-trust issues, for example, should require no
citation. It is true that the use of political science sources created a stir among
some when Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided. See, e.g.,
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1476 n.12 (2d ed., The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1988) (1978) (“The Court’s reliance on social science
evidence, as well as the reliability of the evidence itself, has been severely
criticized.”). Nevertheless, scruples in this regard have been long-since resolved,
at least to judge by the published opinions of a significant portion of the American
judiciary.
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federal court, or academic authority of equivalent stature. It may
well be that a better opinion will do that no less with respect to
foreign authority than domestic authority. But simply the assertion
that better opinions acknowledge countervailing authority does not
mean that the choice of persuasive authority to begin with should
never be made.
B. The Realistic Jurisdictional Selection Issue
Notwithstanding the non-substantive complaint described
above, the jurisdictional selection objection does state a legitimate
issue. Merely because the exercise of a choice is not per se
inappropriate does not mean that all choices made will necessarily
be equally appropriate. There are indeed many countries in the
world with organized legal systems. It seems warranted to presume
that the precedents of not all foreign jurisdictions will be equally
relevant to all issues in all cases. There must be principled bases
for deciding which jurisdictions are suitable for citation in given
circumstances and which are not.
A central point to note about this conundrum is that there is
no reason that the same basis for selection should necessarily
pertain to all circumstances. The recent Supreme Court opinions
that have cited foreign precedent dealt with a variety of
162
constitutional provisions and values, from federalism, to the
Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual
163
punishment, to the right of privacy under the Due Process
164
Clauses. Each of these provisions involves different constitutional
values and, even in the domestic sphere, attracts its own distinct
sets of precedents.
It seems quite possible that the extent and character of foreign

162. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding
unconstitutional portions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that
required state governments to implement a federal program); see supra notes 6-20
and accompanying text.
163. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (holding that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on persons
who committed their crimes before the age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals is
excessive punishment restricted by the Constitution); see also supra text
accompanying notes 21-31, 65-93.
164. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a
Texas statute criminalizing “deviate sexual intercourse” with another person of the
same sex); see also supra text accompanying notes 32-46.
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references could and should vary according to which constitutional
provisions are at issue. In any event, the examination of one such
issue under review, to the exclusion of others, would seem justified
as a tentative step towards the resolution of the jurisdictional
selection objection, at least for that issue. Perhaps if warranted at a
later point in time, such a resolution for that issue can serve as a
basis for resolving a broader set of issues. For present purposes,
however, it must suffice to suggest a way in which reference to the
laws of certain types of particular countries can be legitimately
preferred over the laws of others in addressing one specific issue in
U.S. constitutional law.
V. THE EUROPEAN ENLIGHTENMENT, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The United States Constitution was an outgrowth of the
cultural and political forces of its time. This point is commonly
conceded, though prominent commentators tend to emphasize
roots in the specifically British common law and constitutional
165
tradition.
The point suggested here is much broader. Many of
the ideas reflected in the U.S. Constitution were developed during
the immediately preceding generations by the writers of the
166
European Enlightenment.
It is important to recognize that fact
and accord it substantial weight when analyzing the U.S.
Constitution.
The contents of the Enlightenment and its beginning and
165. E.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 12-13 (1985) (emphasizing the impact of “the
historical ‘rights of Englishmen’” on American law); Scalia & Breyer, supra note
112 (Justice Scalia asserts that “foreign law is irrelevant with one exception: Old
English law, because phrases like ‘due process,’ the ‘right of confrontation’ and
things of that sort were all taken from English law”); see also, e.g., RETT R.
LUDWIKOWSKI & WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA 7
(1993) (“Most of the provisions in the 1787 Constitution and the 1791 Bill of
Rights have antecedents in either British or state government documents, as well
as in the Constitution’s immediate predecessor, the Articles of Confederation.”).
166. The Enlightenment has been defined as “a philosophic movement of the
[eighteenth] century characterized by an untrammeled but frequently uncritical
use of reason, a lively questioning of authority and traditional doctrines and
values, a tendency toward individualism, and an emphasis on the idea of universal
human progress and on the empirical method in science.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 754 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1993); see also 1 PETER
GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION: THE RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM 3-27
(1966) (discussing the philosophies of the Enlightenment that formed many of
the views of American political thinkers).
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167

ending points are not universally agreed upon.
However, for
present purposes this Article will define the phrase “European
Enlightenment” as collectively describing the work of a significant
number of prominent philosophers and political theorists who,
from the early seventeenth century through the late eighteenth
century (approximately 200 years), had a profound effect on the
168
political and social development of modern Western Civilization.
Among the concepts developed by these singular thinkers were
various refinements on a contractarian theory between the
169
individual and the State, the importance of individual autonomy
170
and fulfillment both to the individual and to the State, the
167. Professor Gay addressed the differing views of beginning and ending
points for the Enlightenment, finally deciding upon what he considered dates that
the most “traditional” historical approaches would discern: the hundred-year
period between 1689 and 1789. 1 GAY, supra note 166, at 17. Others also date the
Enlightenment from shortly before the end of the seventeenth century. See, e.g.,
Werner Schneiders, Reason, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 1125 (Michel
Delon, et al. eds., 2001) (“From the beginning of the Aufklärung—that is, around
1690—German philosophers conceived their mission as one of enlightenment or
as an improvement of understanding.” (internal quotations omitted)). However,
my focus is on the genealogy of the U.S. Constitution, and in my opinion, the
philosophical antecedents require a longer period of reference. Beginning the
Enlightenment in the early seventeenth century allows for the inclusion of
Descartes, for example, whose influence on Locke is clear and whose work played
a key role in developing the tension between rationality and empiricism. E.g.,
RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND 335 (1991) (“Locke, however,
attempted a partial solution to such problems by making the distinction (following
Galileo and Descartes) between primary and secondary qualities—between those
qualities that inhere in all extended material objects as objectively measurable, like
weight and shape and motion, and those that inhere only in the subjective human
experience of those objects, like taste and odor and color.”). There seems to be
less disagreement about the ending point, although it might be said that this is less
material. Michel Delon, Representations of Enlightenment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
ENLIGHTENMENT, supra, at 461 (“[T]he [modern] critical attitude implies avoiding
the choice between being inside or being outside [the Enlightenment].
Enlightenment man [civilization] is ever at the edge.”).
168. Cf. Delon, supra note 167, at 462 (“[C]ontemporary authors are
contributing to the continuous displacement of the frontier between the
Enlightenment and the non-Enlightenment—in other words, they are
contributing to the transformation and redefinition of the Enlightenment itself.”).
169. E.g., Dietrich Berding & Diethelm Klippel, Social Contract, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 167, at 1240-43 (generally
describing the idea of a social contract as one of the major elements of the
European Enlightenment). In particular, “Thomas Hobbes, who is considered the
father of modern social contract theory, used the concept to justify absolutism.
On the other hand, a liberal version of the theory, usually associated with John
Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, did emerge.” Id. at 1240-41.
170. E.g., Didier Deleule, Liberalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT,
supra note 167, at 768 (“Meanwhile in the social and economic realms, the
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importance of reason (as opposed to faith or superstition) as a
171
basis for the acceptance of principles of social ordering, and the
centrality of skepticism and doubt to the necessary task of
172
correcting the superstitions and prejudices of earlier ages.
173
Among the most celebrated of these intellects were Thomas
174
175
Hobbes (1588–1679), René Descartes (1596–1650), John Locke
176
177
(1632–1704), the Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), David
178
179
Hume (1711–1776), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), and
individual acquired new prominence, coming to embody initiative and a certain
taste for entrepreneurship—a practice that had its roots in individual self-interest
and adopted the goal of the maximum satisfaction of that same self-interest,
thereby promoting, in the complex play of social relations initiated in this way,
what became known as the common good. In this regard, the function of the state
was defined as guaranteeing this ‘natural’ individual disposition . . . .”). As
explained in Liberalism, “[t]he common basis of political and economic liberalism
is indeed the individual: the state, having once been master over individuals, was
required to place itself at their service and become their tool.” Id. at 769 (citation
omitted).
171. E.g., Schneiders, supra note 167, at 1125-26 (discussing the place of
reason in particular connection with the German Enlightenment, or Aufklärung);
see also Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 455-57 (1996)
(discussing Enlightenment concepts of reason).
172. E.g., Babara De Negroni, Doubt, Scepticism and Pyrrhonism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 167, at 392 (“[T]he Enlightenment philosophes
regarded doubt as the only means of radically challenging the prejudices that
upbringing and society have inculcated in us and the illusions that constantly
deceive us . . . . For Enlightenment thinkers, doubt was primarily a critical tool that
made it possible to denounce errors, prejudices, the illusions to which men fall
victim, and the machinations employed in order to dominate them more
effectively.”).
173. In the substance of many of their ideas, there could be as much that
divided some of these writers from one another as united them. Nevertheless,
they were all active and renowned during this period, and they all played a role in
the development of the ideas involved.
174. See generally FRANK M. COLEMAN, HOBBES AND AMERICA: EXPLORING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (1977) (providing support for the theory that
Hobbes is the “true ancestor of American constitutionalism”).
175. See generally Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From) Enlightenment?, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1263 (2004) (discussing generally the work of Descartes during the
Enlightenment period).
176. See generally LOCKE’S MORAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (J.R. Milton
ed., 1999) (providing a collection of essays analyzing the philosophies of John
Locke); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985)
(discussing the writings of John Locke and his contribution to early American
political ideas).
177. See generally ANNE M. COHLER, MONTESQUIEU’S COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND
THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1988) (acknowledging Montesquieu’s
work as having a direct influence on the shape of the U.S. Constitution).
178. See generally KNUD HAAKONSSEN, THE SCIENCE OF A LEGISLATOR: THE
NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE OF DAVID HUME AND ADAM SMITH (1981) (providing an
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180

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).
Many of the framers were aware of most of these writers.
Several of them were cited in The Federalist Papers and in other works
181
While
of direct relevance to the Constitution’s establishment.
certain of these individuals were not explicitly named by the
framers in the process of drafting the Constitution, the impact of
their ideas was a substantial basis for concepts reflected in
constitutional text and structure.
The impact of Montesquieu’s ideas on the separation of
powers for the framers is well known. The authors of The Federalist
Papers referenced his work repeatedly, at one point anointing him
182
with the encomium, “[t]he celebrated Montesquieu.”
The work
of John Locke, emphasizing the importance of personal property
rights, is reflected in the Fifth Amendment Due Process and
Takings Clauses and elsewhere in the constitutional text. The basic
idea of a social contract, initially elaborated upon by Hobbes and
then refined (to somewhat different effects) by Locke and
Rousseau, underlies the very concept of a written constitution as a
pact among its framers, the broader contemporary society, and
183
succeeding generations.
Even when the framers did not
overview of Hume’s theory of justice).
179. See generally STEVEN JOHNSTON, ENCOUNTERING TRAGEDY: ROUSSEAU AND THE
PROJECT OF DEMOCRATIC ORDER (1999) (discussing the work of Rousseau and his
contributions to western political thought).
180. See generally ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT’S THEORY OF JUSTICE (1993) (discussing
the main elements of Kant’s political philosophy and describing Kant as one of the
founders of classical liberalism).
181. Montesquieu is cited numerous times in The Federalist Papers. THE
FEDERALIST No. 9, at 52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan
Univ. Press 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), supra, at 291-92; THE
FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra, at 324. Hume is cited only once. THE
FEDERALIST No. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at 594 n.*. However, the
influence of Hume is reported to be significant. MCDONALD, supra note 165, at 7
(stating that Hamilton and Madison quoted or paraphrased Hume without
acknowledgment). Similarly, the work of John Locke was elemental to many of
the ideas expressed in The Federalist Papers. Id. (affirming that Locke’s theories of
contract and natural-rights were reiterated without mention of their origin).
182. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 181, at 523 n.*.
Not all references to Montesquieu in The Federalist Papers are equally laudable but
all evince his influence.
183. The relationship between the European Enlightenment and the U.S.
Constitution has been particularly connected with respect to the growth of
liberalization in Europe and America. E.g., Dietrich Berding & Diethelm Klippel,
Natural Law and the Rights of Man, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra
note 167, at 895 (“This process [the secularization of natural law into liberal
natural law] reached a temporary conclusion in North America and France with
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specifically refer to Enlightenment authors by name, the concepts
that the Europeans had developed for generations served as the
184
basis for much of their thought.
A. Fundamental Rights and the Enlightenment
Among the central concepts developed in the course of the
European Enlightenment is the singular notion that any human
185
being has certain basic rights simply by virtue of being human.
186
This was famously expressed in the Declaration of Independence.
It also found political expression, however, in other foundational
documents of the period, such as the French Declaration of the
187
Rights of Man and the Citizen.
The French Declaration echoed
the American Declaration’s emphasis on the “Pursuit of
188
Happiness,” presaged the religious liberty guaranteed in the U.S.
189
Federal Bill of Rights, and helped to usher in the concept of
the bills of rights of various American States, the U.S. Constitution, and the 1789
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen.”).
184. Again, there existed a synergy between liberalizing developments in legal
and political theory between Europe and America. E.g., Otto Dann, Nation, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 167, at 883, 885 (“The
Enlightenment Project of nation building was a project of social emancipation.
Removing the religious and social barriers of the ancien régime would provide the
various strata of a single people with the means to integrate into a civil society
based on a common written culture and organized politically in a modern state.
Finally, after the United States had gained independence and adopted a
republican constitution, the new North American nation was held up as a
precursor in Europe.”).
185. See, e.g., 1 GAY, supra note 166, at 3.
186. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these
Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness . . . .”).
187. FRANCE: DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN 1789,
reprinted in COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS, at 208-10 (S.E. Finer et al. eds., 1995).
188. E.g., Michel Delon, Happiness, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT,
supra note 167, at 635 (“The happiness that [Louis-Antoine-Léon] Saint-Just was
invoking [before the French National Assembly] is collective, social, and
political—the common good rather than individual well-being. It corresponds to
the first article of the [Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen]. . . .
The idea of the pursuit of happiness marked a break with the tradition that had
placed the highest value on the salvation of the soul or the glory of the prince.”).
189. E.g., Hanna Roose, Protestantism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT,
supra note 167, at 1116 (“The [French] Revolution brought religious freedom to
the Huguenots. The Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (27 August 1789;
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) guaranteed freedom of
conscience and of worship. After 24 December 1789, Protestants were allowed to
hold public office.”).
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190

popular sovereignty.
The French Declaration was promulgated by the revolutionary
French government in 1789, the same year the first U.S. Congress
191
was seated pursuant to our current Constitution. The text of the
original U.S. Constitution explicitly guarantees similar fundamental
192
rights, such as the right to a trial by jury, the right against
193
arbitrary imprisonment through petitions for habeas corpus, and
194
the right to be free from the retroactive impairment of contracts.
Upon the adoption of the Bill of Rights two years later, the list of
explicitly guaranteed rights was expanded.
B. Fundamental Rights and the U.S. Constitution
The modern Supreme Court has developed the concept of
fundamental rights in a non-textual sense through its
interpretation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause. These non-textual fundamental rights can be traced to the
195
1942 case of Skinner v. Oklahoma, in which the Court referred to
“marriage and procreation” as being among the “basic civil rights
of man,” and as being “fundamental to the very existence” of
196
humanity.
Accordingly, the Court in Skinner suggested for the
first time that “strict scrutiny” was necessary for any governmental
act that impaired rights that could be considered so basic as to be
197
“fundamental” in this sense.
Since Skinner, this doctrine of fundamental rights has grown
190. E.g., Jean Bart, Law, Public, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra
note 167, at 764, 767 (“[P]ublic law [can be defined] as the law ‘that has been
established for the common use of people considered as a political body.’ It
differs from ‘private law, which is enacted for the used of each person considered
individually and independently of other persons.’ . . . Thus the notion of public
law . . . was at the heart of the political debate waged in the years before the
French Revolution. At that period, the concept was easily absorbed into that of
the [French] constitution . . . before it would be fully implemented in the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen . . . .”).
191. For a detailed comparison between the French and English revolutions and their
comparative philosophical impacts on U.S. constitutional law, see Harold J. Berman, The
Impact of the Enlightenment on American Constitutional Law, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
311 (1992).
192. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
193. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
194. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
195. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute
under which habitual criminals could be sterilized).
196. Id. at 541.
197. Id.
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considerably, having been applied through both the Due Process
and Equal Protection guaranties to protect interests in privacy
198
199
200
including contraception, abortion, and marriage, and the
201
202
Activists and litigators
rights of interstate travel and voting.
have attempted at various points in time to expand the list of
fundamental rights that would be subject to the strict scrutiny
requirement. Members of the Supreme Court have been skeptical
of such efforts. For example, the Court has declared that
203
education is not a fundamental right in this sense. Also, in some
circumstances, an unmarried man’s right to the consortium of his
204
Initially,
minor child does not constitute a fundamental right.
the Court held in 1986 that the interest perceived by same-sex
couples to engage in private sexual relations was not a fundamental
205
right.
In 2003, the Court offered protection to this interest but
198. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute criminalizing the use of contraceptives and
the provision of assistance in obtaining contraceptives).
199. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional Texas
statutes criminalizing abortion).
200. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a
Wisconsin statute requiring non-custodial parents obliged to provide financial
support for minor children to receive court permission before marrying).
201. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding
unconstitutional statutory provisions requiring welfare recipients to have been
residents of the state for one year prior to applying for benefits).
202. E.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (concluding
that requiring payment of Virginia poll tax as precondition to voting violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
203. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(concluding that there is no fundamental right to education and that the Texas
method of funding public education is constitutional).
204. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that a California
statute presuming the cohabiting husband of a woman to be her child’s father did
not violate due process rights of the child or of the putative natural father). This
case is not as much of a negative indicator as it might initially appear. There was
no opinion of the Court, and the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia attached
importance to the fact that the child’s mother was living with a man other than the
child’s probable father but to whom she was married at the time the child was
born. Id. at 129-30. The case did not present a situation in which the mother was
unmarried. Also, the concurring opinion by Justice Stevens, which was necessary
to help form the judgment, was grounded on statutory interpretation rather than
the primary constitutional question. Id. at 133-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
However, on the basis of the Court’s subsequent reluctance to find new
constitutional rights, I assume that the Court may not be receptive to finding a
fundamental right for a natural father’s consortium with his child born out of
wedlock even in more general circumstances.
205. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding constitutional a
Georgia law criminalizing sodomy and explicitly refusing to announce a
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not necessarily on the basis that it encompassed a fundamental
206
right.
The primary motivation for the resistance exhibited by Court
members toward the expansion of fundamental rights is rooted in
207
concern for majoritarian democracy.
After all, whenever strict
scrutiny is used to invalidate a governmental act that is held to
impair a fundamental right, the will of the popularly-elected
legislature is frustrated. However, the mere observation that the
enforcement of a fundamental right through strict scrutiny can be
counter-majoritarian does not answer the question of whether an
asserted new right should become a fundamental right. The
observation may be a basis for urging restraint in finding new
fundamental rights, but it does not provide a basis for determining
which asserted rights, from one juncture to the next, should be
considered fundamental.
The failure of majoritarianism to provide a key in identifying
fundamental rights is emphasized by the Enlightenment idea that
208
human rights cannot be removed.
The Declaration of
“fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy”). Justice White stated that
“we are quite unwilling” to hold that there is “a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy.” Id. at 191. Perhaps somewhat famously, at least for
followers of this area of the law, he added that any claim that “a right to engage in
such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.” Id. at 194.
206. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers and holding
unconstitutional a Texas statute criminalizing intimate sexual contact between
persons of the same sex even in the privacy of a home). The Court in Lawrence
never indicated whether its holding was based on a determination of the existence
of a fundamental right. Indeed, the character of the right on which the Court’s
holding was based is the subject of some discussion. See generally Dale Carpenter, Is
Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140 (2004) (examining how broadly the
Lawrence decision should be read).
207. A passage from Justice White’s opinion of the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick
illustrates this type of concern:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to
discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution. . . . There should be,
therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the Due
Process and Equal Protection] Clauses, particularly if it requires
redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise,
the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the
country without express constitutional authority.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
208. See Berding & Klippel, supra note 183, at 893, 895 (“The rights of man
established by the United States’ Bill of Rights . . . marked a fundamental
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Independence refers to basic rights of all persons as being
“inalienable,” asserting that the rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness are simply “among” those so denominated and
209
not a complete catalog of them.
The “inalienability” of these
rights, as well as the notion that people possess the rights because
they have been “endowed” by the people’s “creator,” have roots in
210
natural-law theory.
Although natural-law theory was problematic
for some during the Enlightenment, there is no doubt of its power
211
or influence during the period.
Members of the Supreme Court rarely offer explicit
methodologies for identifying fundamental rights. The only
prominent example of such an attempt is the plurality opinion in
212
the 1989 case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.
In that opinion, Justice
Scalia’s explication of a (very limiting) methodology for identifying
213
fundamental rights was joined by only one other Justice.
It is not difficult to see why some people, including Justice
Scalia, might be reluctant to find new fundamental rights, even
214
apart from the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”
Trying to
determine a balance between individual rights and social stability is
an endeavor of profound implications for a society. Each political
society in the world can be defined in terms of the balance it strikes
between individual rights and the collective interest, whether
envisioned in terms of stability, tradition, collective will, or some
other countervailing value. At first glance, this seems to support an
ethnocentric view of fundamental rights—if the balance between
transition from the feudal notion of freedom . . . to the concept of the inalienable
rights of individuals, of man as man, as defined in the Bill of Rights . . . .”).
209. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
210. See Berding & Klippel, supra note 183, at 893, 895.
211. See, e.g., 2 PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION: THE
SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 457 (1969) (“In the hands of the philosophes, natural law
was, in effect, secular, a modern version of classical pagan speculation: there are
eternal immutable principles of morality that stand as critics of positive law, for
they often contradict it.”); accord Berding & Klippel, supra note 183, at 893, 894
(charting the development of natural-law theory from a sectarian base in the
Middle Ages through to its later secularization and ultimate status as an aspect of
liberalism).
212. 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see supra note 204 and accompanying text.
213. The famous “footnote 6” approach set forth in the lead opinion, the
source of that opinion’s most detailed description of methodology, expressed the
views only of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127
n.6.
214. Basic background discussions of the “counter-majoritarian” or “antimajoritarian difficulty” were provided, for example, by authorities such as
Laurence Tribe. TRIBE, supra note 161, at 61-66.
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individual rights and the collective interest defines a society, then
only the authorities of that society should be involved in setting the
limits of individual rights within it.
In the larger scheme of things, however, there is no reason to
suppose that any one society has hit on the optimal balance, in
some objective sense, between individual rights and the collective
interest. Judges in any one society attempting to discern whether
newly asserted rights should qualify as fundamental might benefit,
in a subjective sense, from exploring which rights other societies
have considered to be fundamental. This is not to suggest that
judges in one society should feel bound by the rules of another, but
simply to note that the experience of other societies can be
215
informative in their consideration of the issue.
C. A Basis for Comparison
The very idea that fundamental rights cannot be taken away
even by a majority vote traces its roots to the European
Enlightenment. As noted earlier, the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen was issued the same year the first
government under the U.S. Constitution was established. John
Locke’s conception of property as a fundamental right finds its way
at numerous junctures into the U.S. constitutional tradition, and
the idea of fundamental notions of liberty is implicit in much of
216
Enlightenment theory.
The countries in which the European Enlightenment
217
flourished have had well over two centuries to address and
215. In his debate with Justice Scalia, for example, Justice Breyer indicated that
references to foreign sources do not suggest that the foreign sources have
mandatory effect, allowing that “it’s important that these things not be binding.”
Scalia & Breyer, supra note 112; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our
Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 337 (2004) (suggesting that considering the law of foreign
nations in domestic constitutional opinions is, in the language of the Declaration
of Independence, according “a decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind,”
and predicting that the Court “will continue to accord” this respect “as a matter of
comity and in a spirit of humility”). The emphasis Justice Ginsburg places in
“comity” distinguishes the usage of foreign sources for persuasive purposes from a
usage based on binding precedent.
216. E.g., Jürgen Heideking, North America, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 167, at 921, 923 (“In addition to the Declaration of
Independence, the federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights (added to the
Constitution in 1791) were the principal American contributions to the
Enlightenment—contributions that still have not lost their vigor.”).
217. Professor Gay discusses the Enlightenment in England, Scotland, France,
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experiment with the ideas it espoused. In particular, each of those
countries has arrived at its own dynamic of balance between
individual rights and the necessary interests of the State. There is
thus a wealth of experience in each of the countries of the
European Enlightenment regarding the protection and
accommodation of fundamental rights.
Other states are unlikely to have experienced the same degree
of involvement with the idea of fundamental rights over the same
218
period of time.
Even if some states in other parts of the world
confronted a similar issue during this time period, those states,
lying outside the geographic area which experienced the
intellectual and political stimulation of the Enlightenment period,
would have had fundamentally different experiences than Western
Europe and the United States.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Western European experience informed and undergirded much of the U.S. Constitution, especially the concept of
219
This could well prove a basis for resolving
fundamental rights.
the jurisdictional selection objection in the context of identifying
fundamental rights. Those countries that formed a part of the
European Enlightenment, by virtue of their centuries of experience
with its concepts, are significantly better suited than others as
examples of how to resolve the conflict between individual liberty
and collective security or stability. Judges, commentators, and
other observers can safely reference authorities from these
countries when attempting to identify fundamental rights.

Italy, and Germany. 1 GAY, supra note 166, at 3-19.
218. I hasten to note that my emphasis on the countries of the European
Enlightenment is not meant to suggest that other countries of the world are not currently
“enlightened,” in the modern sense. Indeed, many other areas of the world have rich and
illustrious cultural and intellectual histories. However, the U.S. Constitution has an
intimate relationship with this particular period of Western intellectual history.
219. See supra Parts V-V.A.
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